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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILD WILLOW LIMITED COMPANY, 
a Utah Limited Liability 
Company, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TOWN OF FRANCIS, a municipal 
corporation; BRAD McNEIL, 
individually and as Mayor of 
the Town of Francis, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on interlocutory appeal 
of the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction. 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear the case under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the district court err in granting a 
preliminary injunction where Wild Willow Limited Company neither 
satisfied nor attempted to satisfy all four requirements of rule 
65A(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the preliminary injunction 
rule? 
An appellate court may disturb a trial court's judgment 
granting an injunction if the court abused its discretion or the 
judgment rendered is clearly against the weight of the evidence. 
Case No. 940311 
Category No. 10 
Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990, 993 (Utah 
1993). If the trial court bases its grant of an injunction on a 
misconception of the requirements of the pertinent rule of civil 
procedure, that decision is necessarily an abuse of discretion. 
See Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah App. 1990) (because 
the trial court based its decision to exclude expert testimony on 
the court's misconception of the law, that decision was 
necessarily an abuse of discretion), cert. denied (Utah Jan. 11, 
1991); Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande R.R., 830 P.2d 291, 297 
(Utah App.) (trial court abuses its discretion when it exceeds 
the procedural authority granted it by the court rules), cert, 
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
Citation to record where issue preserved in the trial 
court: R. 78-79. 
2. Did the district court err in not applying the 
deferential statutory standard for review of a municipality's 
land use decision in concluding that Wild Willow is likely to 
prevail on its claim that the Francis Town Council improperly 
suspended the prior plat approval for Wild Willow's subdivision? 
An appellate court independently reviews a district 
court's interpretation of a statute for correctness. Ward v. 
Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). 
Citation to record where issue preserved in the trial 
court: R. 73. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 65A(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary 
injunction may issue only upon a showing by 
the applicant that: 
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable 
harm unless the order or injunction issues; 
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant 
outweighs whatever damage the proposed order 
or injunction may cause the party restrained 
or enjoined; 
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would 
not be adverse to the public interest; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that 
the applicant will prevail on the merits of 
the underlying claim, or the case presents 
serious issues on the merits which should be 
the subject of further litigation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (1992): 
(1) No person may challenge in district 
court a municipality's land use decisions 
made under this chapter or under the 
regulation made under authority of this 
chapter until that person has exhausted his 
administrative remedies, 
(2) Any person adversely affected by any 
decision made in the exercise of the 
provisions of this chapter may file a 
petition for review of the decision with the 
district court within 30 days after the local 
decision is rendered. 
(3) The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and 
regulations are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the 
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 1, 1994, Wild Willow Limited Company filed 
suit against the Town of Francis and its Mayor, Brad McNeil, for 
injunctive and monetary relief based primarily on the Town 
Council's allegedly wrongful rescission of Wild Willow's 
previously approved plat for a subdivision development in 
Francis, Utah (R. 1-23A). It filed an amended complaint on May 
19, 1994 (R. 32-56). 
On May 20, 1994, Wild Willow filed a motion for a 
temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction 
(R. 57-63) . That motion sought an order from the trial court 
restraining the Town and Mayor from enforcing the Town Council's 
decision to rescind the prior plat approval and a related stop 
work order served by the Mayor on Wild Willow (id.). 
On May 25, 1994, the trial court heard and granted the 
motion for a preliminary injunction against the Town and Mayor 
(T. 31-32) . The court entered a written preliminary injunction 
on June 3, 1994 (R. 131-32). The Town filed a motion for 
suspension of the injunction pending disposition of a petition 
for interlocutory appeal, which the court denied (R. 142-45, 259-
60) . 
On June 17, 1994, the Town filed a petition for 
permission to appeal the preliminary injunction in this Court, 
along with a motion for suspension of the injunction pending 
disposition of the petition (R. 177-210). On July 15, 1994, this 
Court granted the motion for suspension of the injunction, and on 
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July 20, 1994, granted the petition for interlocutory appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The material facts are not in dispute.1 Plaintiff, 
Wild Willow Limited Company ("Wild Willow"), is the owner of 
property located within the Town of Francis and desires to 
develop a subdivision2 on that property, which will likely 
double the population of that small town.3 Wild Willow obtained 
final plat approval of the first of three phases of its 
development from the Town Planning Commission on December 7, 
1993. On December 15, 1993, the Town Council issued its final 
plat approval for the first phase. Wild Willow recorded the plat 
with the Summit County Recorder in January 1994. This is the 
first subdivision plan that was presented to the Town for 
approval under the Town's new Development Code ("Code"). 
Subsequently, a newly constituted Town Council reviewed 
the question of Wild Willow's noncompliance with certain 
significant requirements of the Code in obtaining final plat 
approval and the additional question of whether the Council had 
erroneously given such approval in light of that noncompliance. 
The Council held a special meeting and rescinded the prior plat 
1
 This statement of facts is drawn from the trial court's 
Findings of Fact and the parties' pleadings in the trial court 
(R. 57-60, 70-79, 137-38). 
2
 Technically, it seeks to develop a "planned unit 
development" under the Development Code of the Town of Francis. 
"Subdivision" is used generically here. 
3
 Francis is a town of approximately 450 people, which is 
located about 15 miles east of Park City. Wild Willow's multi-
phase development contemplates the construction of 153 homes. 
5 
approval on March 15, 1994. The Town's attorney advised Wild 
Willow of the rescission in a letter dated March 25, 1994. 
Having received the March 25th letter and thus fully 
aware of the Council's rescission, Wild Willow nevertheless began 
taking bids for construction of the utilities and other 
improvements for the development on or about March 30, 1994. 
Thereafter, it entered into construction contracts. 
On April 1, 1994, Wild Willow filed suit against the 
Town and its mayor, Brad McNeil, alleging that the Town Council 
had wrongfully rescinded the final plat approval. The suit 
requested injunctive and monetary relief (R. 1-23A) . On May 16, 
1994, the Town, through the Mayor, issued a stop work order to 
Wild Willow which required it to cease construction of the 
development. Wild Willow filed an amended complaint on May 19, 
1994 (R. 32-56) . 
On May 20, 1994, Wild Willow filed a motion for a 
temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction 
(R. 57-63) . An affidavit of C. Taylor Burton, a principal of 
Wild Willow, accompanied Wild Willow's four-page motion, but no 
memorandum of law was submitted. (Copies of Wild Willow's motion 
and the Burton affidavit are contained in Addendum A) . Wild 
Willow noticed a hearing for May 25, 1994 (R. 68-69). 
On May 24, 1994, the Town Council convened a special 
meeting, fully noticed to Wild Willow and the public, to review 
its rescission decision and to receive comment from Wild Willow 
and the public. After hearing comment and discussing the matter, 
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the Council voted to put the final plat approval "on hold" 
pending full compliance by Wild Willow with the Code's 
requirements. The Council also decided that no building permits 
were to be issued for the development during the period in which 
final plat approval was suspended. 
Of clear concern to the Council were the health, safety 
and welfare issues of Wild Willow's failure to file, prior to 
approval by either the Town Planning Commission or the Council 
and as required by the Code, (1) an Environmental Impact 
Statement, (2) a letter from the local fire protection district 
indicating its final approval of the plan for fire protection 
measures, (3) documentation that sufficient water had been 
transferred and dedicated to the Town for the development, and 
(4) a statement from the State Health Department containing 
recommendations pertaining to the proposed sewage disposal system 
and treatment facilities. 
The next day, the district court held the scheduled 
hearing on Wild Willow's motion for a temporary restraining order 
and/or a preliminary injunction. At that hearing, Wild Willow 
presented no evidence of the basis of the Town Council's 
decisions of March 15 and May 24, 1994 to rescind the final plat 
approval and then to put it "on hold," and proceeded solely on 
its verified complaint, the Burton affidavit, and a copy of the 
recorded plat (T. 3-32) . 
The district court granted a preliminary injunction, 
concluding that (1) "by reason of the final approval of Phase I 
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and the recording of the plat, plaintiff has a vested right to 
proceed with the development of the subdivision"; (2) "by reason 
of the actions of the Town, plaintiff is suffering and will 
continue to suffer great and irreparable harm in the form of lost 
lot sales, the loss of the contractor and/or substantial cost of 
delay, the loss of a building season with attendant costs and 
expenses, together with the loss of use of property in accordance 
with the vested rights of plaintiff"; and (3) "the plaintiff has 
shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits." 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 3 (copies of the 
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the 
Preliminary Injunction appear as Addendum B). 
The injunction, signed by the court on June 3, 1994, 
enjoins and directs the Town and Mayor McNeil as follows: 
1. From enforcing that certain Stop Order 
Notice dated May 16, 1994. 
2. From taking any action which purports to 
rescind the final approval of Wild Willow 
Planned Development including any action to 
put the approval of said project on hold. 
3. The Town is hereby directed, by and 
through the Town engineer, to approve the 
plans and specifications for the utility 
improvements and to advise plaintiff as to 
the method of inspection of such improvements 
as they are constructed. 
4. The Town is hereby directed, by and 
through appropriate officials, to consider 
and approve, where otherwise appropriate, the 
necessary building permits. 
Preliminary Injunction at 2 (Addendum B). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the applicant must 
satisfy four distinct requirements set forth in rule 65A(e), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In making application for a 
preliminary injunction, Wild Willow neither satisfied nor 
attempted to satisfy all four requirements, arguing only two of 
the four requirements: that if an injunction were not issued it 
would suffer irreparable harm, and that it enjoyed a substantial 
likelihood of success on the merits. 
The district court granted a preliminary injunction, 
entering findings only on the two factors argued by Wild Willow. 
The court failed to consider or make any findings on the other 
two requirements of rule 65A(e): that the threatened injury to 
the applicant outweighs whatever damage the injunction may cause 
the party enjoined, and that the injunction, if issued, would not 
be adverse to the public interest. In failing to do so, the 
court committed legal error and necessarily abused its discretion 
in issuing an injunction. Vacation of the injunction is 
therefore warranted. 
An additional error that justifies vacation of the 
preliminary injunction is the district court's refusal to apply 
the statutory standard for review of a municipality's land use 
decision. 
Under the Utah Code, the Town Council's decision to 
suspend the prior plat approval of Wild Willow's subdivision is 
presumed to be valid, and a court reviewing that decision may 
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"determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal." The trial court ignored this statutory 
standard of judicial review in concluding that Wild Willow had 
demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. 
By doing so, it allowed Wild Willow to escape a burden it was 
required to shoulder and to avoid the in-depth legal analysis 
that normally would be required to satisfy the "substantial 
likelihood of success" prong of the preliminary injunction rule. 
The plain language of the statute simply does not permit such a 
result. 
In short, the court again committed legal error and 
necessarily abused its discretion in issuing an injunction. 
Based on this error and the error discussed above, this Court 
should vacate the preliminary injunction and remand the case to 
the trial court for a determination of the costs and attorneys' 
fees, including those incurred on appeal, to be awarded the Town 
for its defense against the wrongfully issued injunction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ISSUING A 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WHERE WILD WILLOW 
NEITHER SATISFIED NOR ATTEMPTED TO SATISFY 
ALL FOUR REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION RULE, AND WHERE THE COURT DID NOT 
FIND THAT ALL FOUR REQUIREMENTS HAD BEEN MET 
The district court issued a preliminary injunction 
based on a perceived satisfaction by Wild Willow of only two of 
the four requirements of Utah's preliminary injunction rule --
rule 65A(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In that the plain 
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language of rule 65A(e) and the case law from which the rule 
derives demand satisfaction of all four requirements of the rule 
before an injunction may issue, the court committed legal error 
and necessarily abused its discretion in granting a preliminary 
injunction. 
A. The Legal Standards for Rule 65A(e) 
Subsection (e) of rule 65A was completely revised in 
1991. Advisory Committee Note to Rule 65A, Para, (e) (hereafter 
"Advisory Comm. Note"). It now provides: 
Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary 
injunction may issue only upon a showing by 
the applicant that: 
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable 
harm unless the order or injunction issues; 
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant 
outweighs whatever damage the proposed order 
or injunction may cause the party restrained 
or enjoined; 
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would 
not be adverse to the public interest; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that 
the applicant will prevail on the merits of 
the underlying claim, or the case presents 
serious issues on the merits which should be 
the subject of further litigation. 
"The [advisory] committee [on the Rules of Civil 
Procedure] sought to modernize the grounds for issuance of 
injunctive orders by incorporating . . • explicit standards . . . 
derived from Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n. v. 
Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351, 355 (10th Cir. 1986), 
and Otero Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 665 F.2d 
275, 278 (10th Cir. 1981)." Advisory Comm. Note. Accordingly, 
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federal decisions, particularly those from the Tenth Circuit, 
will provide much of the road map for this Court's interpretation 
of revised rule 65A(e). Advisory Comm. Note ("The substantial 
body of federal case authority in this area should assist the 
Utah courts in developing the law under paragraph (e)."); 
Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Com'n., 814 P.2d 1099, 1102 
(Utah 1991) (if the particular rule of civil procedure is taken 
from the federal rules, the Court "freely look[s] to federal 
authority interpreting that rule"). 
In addition, certain decisions from this Court 
construing the former rule, which do not depend on the specific 
language of the former rule, are relevant to the interpretation 
and application of the revised rule. 
B. Application of Rule 65A(e) in the Instant Case 
In the district court, Wild Willow bore the burden of 
showing entitlement to a preliminary injunction. Utah R. Civ. P. 
65A(b) (3); Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425 
(Utah 1983); Blanao v. Thornburah, 942 F.2d 1487, 1492 (10th Cir. 
1991). "[T]o obtain injunctive relief under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65A(e), [Wild Willow] must [have] by argument and 
evidence convince[d] the trial court that the requirements [of 
the rule] ha[d] been met." Kasco Serv. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 
86, 94 (Utah 1992) (Stewart, J., dissenting). To meet that 
burden, Wild Willow had to satisfy all four requirements of rule 
65A(e). Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e); Blanao, 942 F.2d at 1492. And, 
because a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic 
12 
remedy, see Systems Concepts, Inc., 669 P.2d at 425; GTE Corp. v. 
Williams, 731 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 1984), Wild Willow was 
obligated to show a clear and unequivocal right to relief. SCFC 
ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 
1991). 
The preliminary injunction issued here disturbs the 
status quo, is in certain respects mandatory as opposed to 
prohibitory4, and affords Wild Willow substantially all the 
relief it may recover at the conclusion of a full trial on the 
merits. With this type of injunction, Wild Willow was required 
to "satisfy an even heavier burden of showing that the four 
factors [contained in rule 65A(e)] weighted] heavily and 
compellingly in [its] favor before such an injunction . . . 
issued." Id, 
This heavier burden is justified because " [a] 
preliminary injunction that alters the status quo goes beyond the 
traditional purpose for preliminary injunctions, which is only to 
preserve the status quo until a trial on the merits may be had." 
Id. at 1099. Further, "[m]andatory injunctions are more 
burdensome than prohibitory injunctions because they 
affirmatively require the nonmovant to act in a particular way, 
and as a result place the issuing court in a position where it 
may have to provide ongoing supervision to assure that the 
4
 The injunction is mandatory insofar as it directs the Town 
"to approve the plans and specifications for the utility 
improvements" and "to consider and approve, where otherwise 
appropriate, the necessary building permits." Prelim. Inj. at 2, 
paras. 3, 4 (R. 132). 
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nonmovant is abiding by the injunction." Id. "Finally, a 
preliminary injunction that awards the movant substantially all 
the relief he may be entitled to if he succeeds on the merits is 
similar to the 'Sentence First -- Verdict Afterwards' type of 
procedure parodied in Alice in Wonderland, which is an anathema 
to our system of jurisprudence." Id. (footnote omitted). 
In its motion for a preliminary injunction, Wild Willow 
addressed only two of rule 65A(e)'s requirements for issuance of 
a preliminary injunction. See Pltf.'s Motion for TRO and/or 
Prelim. Inj. (hereafter "Pltf.'s Mot.") (R. 57-60) (Addendum A). 
First, it claimed that it would suffer irreparable injury if an 
injunction were not issued. Pltf.'s Mot. at 3-4 (R. 59-60); see 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e)(1). Second, without articulating the 
point precisely or citing any supporting authority, Wild Willow 
asserted that there is a substantial likelihood it will prevail 
on its underlying claim that once the Town Council approved the 
final plat, Wild Willow had a vested right which could not be 
disturbed by the Council. Pltf.'s Mot. at 2-3 (R. 58-59); see 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e)(4). 
At the hearing on its motion, Wild Willow did not 
expand the argument contained in its papers. Again, it requested 
a preliminary injunction based only on the two claims asserted in 
writing: (1) irreparable harm, and (2) substantial likelihood of 
success on the merits (T. 3-15, 25-30). 
Adopting Wild Willow's position, the district court's 
preliminary injunction is based only on a perceived satisfaction 
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of subsections (1) and (4) of rule 65A(e). It made no findings 
on subsections (2) and (3) of the rule. Indeed, neither Wild 
Willow nor the district court even considered those subsections, 
which require the applicant to show that "[t]he threatened injury 
to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the proposed order or 
injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined," and that 
fl[t]he order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to 
the public interest." 
Even if it were assumed Wild Willow had satisfied 
subsections (1) and (4), that is insufficient for the issuance of 
a preliminary injunction. As previously noted, all four 
subsections must be satisfied before a preliminary injunction may 
issue. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc.. 936 F.2d at 1102. 
This is obvious from the plain language of the rule, which sets 
out the four factors conjunctively, not disjunctively. Rule 
65A(e). The advisory committee note is equally clear on the 
point: "Federal courts require proof of compliance with each of 
the four standards[.]" Advisory Comm. Note. 
In sum, the court failed to follow the requirements of 
the rule, thereby committing legal error and necessarily abusing 
its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction. See Birch 
Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990, 993 (Utah 1993) 
(appellate court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or 
deny an injunction for abuse of discretion); Gaw v. State, 798 
P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah App. 1990) (because the trial court based 
its decision to exclude expert testimony on the court's 
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misconception of the law, that decision was necessarily an abuse 
of discretion); Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande R.R.. 830 P.2d 
291, 297 (Utah App.) (trial court abuses its discretion when it 
exceeds the procedural authority granted it by the court rules), 
cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
In a similar context, this Court has held that the 
trial court abuses its discretion in issuing a temporary 
restraining order without strictly complying with the 
requirements of rule 65A(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
858 P.2d at 994-95. That same abuse of discretion exists here; 
accordingly, this Court should vacate the preliminary injunction. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE 
DEFERENTIAL STATUTORY STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF 
A MUNICIPALITY'S LAND USE DECISION IN 
CONCLUDING THAT WILD WILLOW IS LIKELY TO 
PREVAIL ON ITS CLAIM THAT THE TOWN COUNCIL 
IMPROPERLY SUSPENDED THE PRIOR PLAT APPROVAL 
FOR WILD WILLOW'S SUBDIVISION 
In concluding that Wild Willow had demonstrated a 
substantial likelihood of success on the merits and therefore was 
entitled to a preliminary injunction, the district court refused 
to apply the standard for review of a municipality's land use 
decision set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) (1992). This 
error provides an additional ground for vacation of the 
preliminary injunction. 
A. The Trial Court Failed to Apply The 
Statutory Standard for Judicial Review 
The legislature has mandated that a municipality's land 
use decision is to be presumed valid and a reviewing court "shall 
16 
. . . determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal." § 10-9-1001(3). See also Mantua Town 
v. Carr, 584 P.2d 912, 913 (Utah 1978); Crestview-Holladay 
Homeowners Assoc, Inc. v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150, 1151-
52 (Utah 1976) . Thus, in its suit against the Town, Wild Willow 
bears the burden of demonstrating that the Council's decision to 
suspend the final plat approval was arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal. To have properly issued the preliminary injunction, the 
district court must have found a substantial likelihood that Wild 
Willow will prevail on that issue. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
65A(e) (4) . 
The Town argued the section 10-9-1001 (3)5 to the 
district court in opposing Wild Willow's motion for a preliminary 
injunction. See Defs.' Mem. in Oppos. to TRO and/or Prelim. Inj. 
at 4 (R. 73). Nevertheless, Wild Willow did not address the 
standard of review question either in its written motion or 
during oral argument on the motion (R. 57-63; T. 3-15, 25-30). 
Indeed, it was not until the Town again noted section 10-9-
1001(3) in its objections to the written preliminary injunction 
(R. 115) that Wild Willow even acknowledged the provision. It 
then argued that the statute did not place the burden on Wild 
Willow, but instead required the Town to "show that the actions 
of the former Town Council were arbitrary and capricious" in 
5
 The Town's papers in the district court erroneously cited 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1002 (1992), rather than section 10-9-
1001(3), as the standard of review provision (R. 73, 115). This 
was a typographical error. 
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order to justify the new Council's subsequent actions. Pltf.'s 
Resp. to Objs. at 3 (R. 125). 
Obviously agreeing with Wild Willow's implicit argument 
that section 10-9-1001(3) did not apply to Wild Willow's request 
for judicial review, the district court refused to incorporate 
the statutory standard of review in either its preliminary 
injunction or findings of fact and conclusions of law. In doing 
so, the court misconstrued the statute. That section 10-9-
1001(3) applies to Wild Willow's judicial attack on the Council's 
suspension of the prior plat approval (a "land use decision") is 
clear from the express terms of the statute: "The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; 
and (b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal." In short, the burden was on Wild 
Willow, the party seeking judicial review, to show that the 
Council acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or illegally in 
suspending the prior plat approval. The trial court erred in not 
requiring Wild Willow to meet this burden. 
B. The Trial Court Compounded Its Error 
Wild Willow's and the district court's fundamental 
misunderstanding of the allocation of burden created an 
additional, related defect in the injunction proceeding. 
Apparently believing the burden was not its, Wild Willow did not 
present a thorough analysis of the central issue in the lawsuit: 
whether the Council could properly suspend the prior plat 
approval. 
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All that Wild Willow did in the district court was to 
argue it had a vested right in the former Council's December 1993 
approval of the first phase of its development, and that the new 
Council could not disturb the prior approval. It submitted no 
memorandum of law to support its position, content to cite only a 
single case (Anderson v. Judd, 404 P.2d 553 (Colo. 1965) (en 
banc)) at the preliminary injunction hearing (R. 30) -- a case 
which does not support Wild Willow's sweeping view that the prior 
plat approval was essentially immune from reconsideration or 
modification. See Anderson, 404 P.2d at 557 (a municipal 
legislative body may reconsider its actions even after the rights 
of third parties have become vested so long as proper notice and 
opportunity for hearing are provided). 
Contrary to what occurred below, Wild Willow was 
required to demonstrate that there is a substantial likelihood of 
success on the issue of whether the Council's suspension action 
was "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." To do so, it 
necessarily had to acknowledge a large body of law relevant to 
the issue of whether the Town Council could suspend the prior 
plat approval. 
Numerous court decisions recognize a municipality's 
power to reconsider and then revoke or modify a prior action, 
including a prior plat approval. See, e.g., Parker v. Bd. of 
County Com'rs., Etc., 603 P.2d 1098 (N.M. 1979) (upholding 
revocation of final plat approval based on subdivider's failure 
to meet county road requirements); Ceresa v. City of Peru, 273 
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N.E.2d 407, 409 (111. App. 1971) (deliberative bodies such as a 
city council have continuing power and authority to consider from 
time to time matters within their jurisdiction, and generally, 
any such reconsideration or renewed consideration may be 
independent of any action that was taken or not taken in the 
past). This is so even if rights have become "vested." Anderson 
v. Judd. 404 P.2d at 557. Further, the Utah Code clearly 
contemplates that the governing body of a municipality may 
reconsider and take appropriate action with respect to a 
previously approved subdivision plat. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-
9-808(1) (a) (1992) (providing that "the governing body of a 
municipality may, with or without a petition, consider any 
proposed vacation, alteration, or amendment of a subdivision 
plat"). 
Wild Willow failed to address any of the foregoing 
legal authority. It also failed to analyze this Court's 
decisions holding that a municipality must follow its own 
ordinances in conducting business, something the former Council 
did not do in approving Wild Willow's plat. See, e.g., West 
Gallery Corp. v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Com'rs., 537 P.2d 1027, 
1028 (Utah 1975) (affirming trial court's injunction against city 
commission which had failed to follow procedures as set forth in 
city ordinance); Carter v. Provo City, 6 Utah 2d 154, 307 P.2d 
906 (1957) (municipal corporation was required to comply with 
city charter and could not properly execute construction contract 
in contravention of charter's requirements). 
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Additionally, Wild Willow failed to consider another 
well established principle in this Court's jurisprudence: 
although local governments have no inherent police power, the 
legislative grant of general welfare authority to local 
governments is construed liberally to allow municipalities to 
provide for the health, safety, and welfare of their residents. 
See, e.g., Redwood Gvm v. Salt Lake County Com'n., 624 P.2d 1138, 
1143 (Utah 1981); State v. Hutchison, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 
1980) . See also Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-1-103 and 10-8-84 (1992) . 
The Council's concern for the Town's health, safety, and welfare 
was clearly the touchstone of its suspension decision. 
Finally, insofar as Wild Willow's "vested right" 
argument implied that the new Council was estopped from 
disturbing the prior plat approval, it failed even to acknowledge 
that Utah's appellate courts have long disfavored application of 
the equitable estoppel doctrine to a municipality's land use 
decisions. See Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980); 
Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 803 (Utah App. 
1992); Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283, 290 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
In sum, Wild Willow failed to advise the trial court of 
the expansive legal landscape relevant to the core issue in this 
case. Indeed, it did not give the trial court even a cursory 
analysis of the pertinent law. Certainly, this is the very least 
the moving party is required to do for purposes of rule 
65A(e) (4) . Therefore, the trial court compounded its error 
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concerning the statutory standard of review by erroneously 
issuing a preliminary injunction in the face of Wild Willow's 
woefully inadequate legal analysis and consequent failure to 
demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Court should 
vacate the preliminary injunction and remand the case for a 
determination of the costs and attorney's fees, including those 
incurred on appeal, to be awarded the Town for its defense 
against the wrongfully issued injunction. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
65A(c). A 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3 day of August, 1994. 
TESCH, THOMPSON & 
SONNENREICH, L.C. 
'JJL 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
JOSEPH E. TESCH 
Attorneys for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellants were hand-delivered to James S. 
Lowrie and James W. Peters, Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 
1500 First interstate Plaza, 170 South Main Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this 3 day of August, 1994. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
WILD WILLOW LIMITED : 
COMPANY, a Utah Limited MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 
Liability Company, : RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
THE TOWN OF FRANCIS, a : 
Municipal corporation; BRAD Civil No. 940300048CV 
McNEIL, individually and as Mayor 
of the Town of Francis, 
Defendants. 
—oooOooo™ 
The plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record and pursuant to Rule 65A, Utah R. 
Civ. P., herewith petitions the Court for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary 
Injunction as follows: 
1. For an order prohibiting and restraining the defendants, their agents, employees and 
attorneys from enforcing that certain Stop Order Notice dated May 16, 1994 and signed by the 
, JLI^ 
defendant Brad McNeil, which purportedly seeks to prevent the ongoing construction of the 
utility improvements for the development known as Wild Willow Planned Development. 
2. For an order prohibiting and enjoining the defendants, their agents, employees and 
attorneys from taking any action which purports to rescind the final approval of the Wild Willow 
Planned Development except in accordance with local ordinance or state law. 
3. For an order directing the Town of Francis, by and through the town engineer, to 
approve the plans and specifications for the utility improvements on the development known as 
Wild Willow Planned Development and to advise the plaintiff as to the method of inspection of 
such improvements as they are constructed. 
This motion is made upon the grounds set forth in the Amended Verified Complaint of 
plaintiff, which establishes the following: 
1. Plaintiff is the owner and developer of property located within the boundaries of the 
Town of Francis and known as the Wild Willow Planned Development. 
2. Plaintiff sought and received final approval for the subdivision plat for Phase I of the 
development from the Town of Francis on or about December 15, 1993. In accordance with 
such approval a subdivision plat, properly executed and approved by the Town Council of the 
Town and bearing all other necessary signatures and certifications was recorded with the Office 
of the Summit County Recorder on January 4, 1994 at 11:24 a.m. as Entry No. 395194. 
3. On or about March 25, 1994 the plaintiff received a written notice from attorney 
Jon C. Heaton, counsel for the Town of Francis, wherein plaintiff was advised that the defendant 
Town had rescinded the final approval of the plat. 
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4. Plaintiff has, with the knowledge of the Town, proceeded with the granting of a 
contract to a contractor for the installation of the utility and road improvements in the project. 
5. On or about April 19, 1994 the town engineer was given a complete set of the plans 
and specifications for the utility and road improvements and was asked for his approval. 
6. To date no approval nor disapproval has been given. 
7. Plaintiff has executed a construction agreement and has required that the contractor 
go forward with the utility improvements. On or about May 16, 1994 plaintiff received a 
document entitled Stop Order Notice, a true and correct copy is attached as Exhibit "A" and by 
this reference incorporated herein. In Exhibit HAM the Town states its belief that the Wild 
Willow project has not been approved for commencement of construction. 
8. By reason of said Stop Order Notice plaintiff is prevented from continuing with the 
orderly construction of the utility improvements as is its right. If construction is not allowed 
to immediately proceed, plaintiff is in danger of not finishing the improvements during this 
building season, will incur substantial additional costs and will lose, in all likelihood, numerous 
lot sales. 
9. Plaintiff presently suffers and shall continue to suffer great and irreparable injury in 
that it is prevented from the lawful and proper use of its property in accordance with state and 
local law. 
10. Until an injunction is entered as requested herein, plaintiff has no adequate remedy 
at law and is prevented from the continued development of its property. 
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11. The only method by which plaintiff can avoid such irreparable injury is through the 
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction whereby the defendant 
is restrained as requested herein. 
12. The issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction in this 
matter will not result in any injury or harm to the defendants. Accordingly the requirement of 
a bond should be made nominal or waived entirely. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays that a Temporary Restraining Order and/or 
Preliminary Injunction be issued restraining and enjoining the defendants as set out above, 
pending a trial on the merits of this matter and a determination that the issues raised by the 
Amended Verified Complaint of plaintiff; and that the amount of the bond required by Rule 
65A(c), Utah R. Civ. P., be waived or set at a nominal amount. 
DATED this 1" day of May, 1994 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
^ C ^ 
ERIC P. LEE 
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I hereby certify that on the / ' day of May, 1994, a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Joseph E. Tesch 
TESCH, THOMPSON & SONNENREICH 
P.O. Box 3390 
Park City, Utah 84060 
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F R A N C I S T O W N C O R P O R A T I O N 
P.O. Box 6M 
Kasms, UT 84036 
(W1) 783-2148 
S T O P O R D E R N O T I C E 
May 16 , 1994 
GRANT HONE - CONTRACTOR -
AND ANY OTHERS TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
It hae come to our attention that your company Is preparing to 
excavate into our atreets and lntenda to connect with our water and 
sewer systems # apparently to provide service to the Wild Willow POD 
development. 
This letter shall eerve ae Notice to you that the Wild Willow 
project hae not been and la not now approved for commencement Of 
construction* No letter of authorization nor permit has been 
given. There are eeveral unresolved matters which are not in 
compliance with the Development Code and other ordinances of 
Francis Town. Our attorney is working with the Developer to get 
theee Items worked out in a manner acceptable to the Town. 
In the meantime, no one has authorization nor permission to 
cut into our etreete, nor to connect to any utility systems in 
Francis Town until further notice. No excavation permits have been 
Issued and no approvals for commencement of the Project have been 
given. The State Uniform Building Code (SECTION 70) providee for 
proper permite and authority from the municipality prior to any 
excavation. 
Failure to comply with this Order shall rssult in prosecution 
to the full extent allowed by law. 
TOWN OF FRANCIS 
Brad McK.il • Mayor 
cc; Joe Teach, Attny 
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Craig G. Adamson (0024) 
Eric P. Lee (4870) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
WILD WILLOW LIMITED 
COMPANY, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THE TOWN OF FRANCIS, a 
Municipal corporation; BRAD 
McNEIL, individually and as Mayor 
of the Town of Francis, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF C. TAYLOR BURTON 
Civil No. 940300048CV 
—oooOooo--
:ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:s 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
C. Taylor Burton being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That Affiant is the managing agent of plaintiff and makes this affidavit on his own 
personal knowledge and belief. 
oojir; i 
2. That Affiant has been personally involved in the development of the Wild Willow 
Project from its inception and has supervised and directed all steps of the approval process. 
3. That throughout the approval process Affiant and other agents dealt directly with the 
Town officials, including the Mayor Paul Mitchell and the Town Planning Commission. 
4. That in each step of the process Affiant made adjustments, amendments and revisions 
to meet and satisfy the concerns of the Town officials and otherwise complied with any and all 
requirements imposed upon the development by the various Town officials. 
5. That to the knowledge of Affiant the Town followed its Development Code as it 
proceeded through the approval process for the project. Ultimately the first phase was approved 
and the plat signed by not only Paul Mitchell, as the Mayor of the Town, but by the chairman 
of the Planning Commission and the Town attorney. 
6. That the Town engineer, Mr. Derek Radke, was given a complete set of the drawings 
for the utility and road improvements on the project on April 19, 1994 by Mr. Jim Kaiserman, 
project engineer. 
7. That despite repeated requests for approval of the plans and specifications so that 
construction could commence, the engineer has neither approved nor disapproved the same. 
8. That in reliance upon the recordation of the final plat for Phase One, Affiant has 
entered into agreements for the sale of twenty-two lots. Some of these lots have closed, others 
are pending closing in the next few weeks. 
9. That in order to allow the lot owners to commence construction on their individual 
lots, and in order not to lose the current construction season, and with the knowledge of the 
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Town, Affiant has entered into a construction contract and has caused the contractor to 
commence the preliminary work on the utility and road improvements, including the delivery 
of materials and the staking of the property. 
10. That unless construction proceeds immediately, Affiant is in danger of losing the 
contractor, who will be forced to take on other work and abandon this project. Alternatively, 
Affiant will be charged a fee by the contractor for each day work is stopped. In addition, 
Affiant will be in jeopardy of being unable to complete the improvements during this building 
season, thereby losing the ability to sell the remaining lots. 
11. Throughout the entire approval process the defendant McNeil has made his presence 
known, has voiced his stringent opposition to the project and has publicly vowed to stop the 
project if possible. 
12. Affiant is informed and therefore alleges that since McNeil became Mayor he has 
continued to voice his opposition to the project, has taken over the duties of the Town Building 
Inspector with respect to the issuance of building permits, has required that all requests for 
permits from Wild Willow be processed by him and has denied any requests for permits. 
DATED this /9\m of May, 1994. 
C. Taylor Burfon 
OOOOOo 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
:ss 
Subscribed to be^osa-iggJBus / \ ,-day of May, 1994 
IOTARY PUBLIC 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the J n day of May, 1994, a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Joseph E. Tesch 
TESCH, THOMPSON & SONNENREICH 
P.O. Box 3390 
Park City, Utah 84060 
yIYld),^rjd 
Pamela K. McDermaid 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
WILD WILLOW LIMITED 
COMPANY, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
THE TOWN OF FRANCIS, a 
Municipal corporation; BRAD 
McNEIL, individually and as Mayor 
of the Town of Francis, 
Defendants. 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Civil No. 940300048CV 
—oooOooo— 
The motion of the plaintiff for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary 
injunction having come on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled Court on Wednesday, 
May 25, 1994, the Honorable David S. Young presiding; the parties and counsel being present; 
the Court having reviewed various evidence including documents, having heard the arguments 
BCCtC -PAGE 0 3 5 
of counsel and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being otherwise 
fully apprised in the facts and law; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction is hereby 
granted, and the defendants and each of them, together with their agents, employees or any 
independent contractor employed by them, are enjoined, restrained and directed as follows: 
1. From enforcing that certain Stop Order Notice dated May 16, 1994. 
2. From taking any action which purports to rescind the final approval of Wild Willow 
Planned Development including any action to put the approval of said project on hold. 
3. The Town is hereby directed, by and through the Town engineer, to approve the plans 
and specifications for the utility improvements and to advise plaintiff as to the method of 
inspection of such improvements as they are constructed. 
4. The Town is hereby directed, by and through the appropriate officials, to consider 
and approve, where otherwise appropriate, the necessary building permits. 
Nothing in this order shall prohibit the defendants from taking such actions with respect 
to the further construction of the development which are in accordance with generally accepted 
and reasonable engineering principals and standards, where appropriate. 
DATED this 
BY THE COURT: 
^ 9 y of^feyrfe94. 
4 V SUMMIT \*\ 
David S. Youn 
District Court 
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Approved as to form: 
Joseph E. Tesch 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of May, 1994, a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing was hand delivered to the following: 
Joseph E. Tesch 
TESCH, THOMPSON & SONNENREICH 
P.O. Box 3390 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Clerk of the Court, Summit County 
50 North Main 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
WILD WILLOW LIMITED 
COMPANY, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THE TOWN OF FRANCIS, a 
Municipal corporation; BRAD 
McNEIL, individually and as Mayor 
of the Town of Francis, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN 
SUPPORT OF ORDER GRANTING 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Civil No. 940300048CV 
—oooOooo— 
The motion of the plaintiff for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary 
injunction having come on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable 
David S. Young presiding on Wednesday, May 25, 1994 at the hour of 1:30 p.m.; the plaintiff 
being present and represented by its counsel, Craig G. Adamson, and the defendants being 
present and represented by their counsel, Joseph E. Tesch. The Court having reviewed the 
Verified Complaint, Amended Verified Complaint, Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction and Affidavit of C. Taylor Burton, together with the memorandum of the 
defendants in opposition to said motion; the Court having heard the arguments of counsel and 
having reviewed the final plat of Phase I of the Wild Willow Planned Development; the Court 
being otherwise advised in the premises now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is the owner of the property which is the subject matter of this action and 
which is known as the Wild Willow Planned Development. 
2. The final plat of Phase I of Wild Willow Planned Development was given final 
approval by the defendant Town of Francis on or about December 14, 1993. 
3. The final plat, bearing the necessary approval signatures of the public utilities, the 
approval signatures of the Town of Francis Planning Commission, the Town of Francis engineer, 
the Town attorney and the Town of Francis Board was recorded with the office of the Summit 
County Recorder on January 4, 1994. 
4. The defendant Town of Francis purported to rescind the final approval of Phase I of 
Wild Willow Planned Development by letter dated March 25, 1994 signed by Jon C. Heaton, 
counsel for the Town. 
5. Immediately subsequent to the recording of the final plat for Phase I plaintiff 
commenced the activity necessary to construct the utility and road improvements including the 
hiring of a contractor, the execution of a construction contract and the sale of lots. 
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6. On or about May 16, 1994 the defendant Town issued a document entitled "Stop 
Order Notice" seeking to stop further construction of the utility improvements. 
7. On May 24, 1994 the defendant Town held a special meeting of the Town Council 
at which meeting a vote was taken to put the approval of Phase I of Wild Willow Development 
on "hold.M 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That by reason of the final approval of Phase I and the recording of the plat, plaintiff 
has a vested right to proceed with the development of the subdivision. 
2. That by reason of the actions of the Town, plaintiff is suffering and will continue to 
suffer great and irreparable harm in the form of lost lot sales, the loss of the contractor and/or 
substantial cost for delay, the loss of a building season with attendant costs and expenses, 
together with the loss of use of the property in accordance with the vested rights of plaintiff. 
3. That the plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. 
4. That a preliminary injunction, in accordance with the motion of the plaintiff, should 
issue, and that the requirement of a bond should be waived. 
DATED this 3^^of^fi^^94. 
BY THE COURT: 
David S. Young 
District Court Jul 
1 ^ / SUMMIT Xn\ 
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Approved as to form: 
Joseph E. Tesch 
Attorney for defendants 
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